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a b s t r a c t
This paper presents evidence from a panel investigation of OECD countries that inflationary pressures
tend to be stronger during recovery from financial crises compared to recovery from non-crisis economic
downturns, indicating impairment in productive potential.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
As the global economy begins to recover from the most severe
financial crisis since the Great Depression, concerns have been
raised that the recent credit crunch has impaired the productive
potential of the worst affected economies such that inflationary
pressures may emerge as the economic recovery gathers pace.
Although the recent empirical literature has for the most part
focused on the impacts on aggregate demand, it has long been
recognized that financial crises (and the associated shortages in
the availability of bank credit) can also affect aggregate supply.
Widespread credit rationing can constrain current production by
restricting the availability of working capital for firms, and also
reduce future production by constraining investment spending
and the future capital stock (Blinder, 1987). These ‘‘supply’’ effects
would manifest through decreasing the amount of spare capacity
which normally opens up following economic downturns, such
that inflationary pressures would be stronger than otherwise. In
this paper, we test for evidence of these effects in the aftermath
of 9 financial crises since 1990. We include the currently ongoing
recoveries from the recent global financial crisis in our estimation
sample in order for our results to be of greater relevance to current
events, but it needs mentioning that these episodes represent
incomplete cycles to date.
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doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.090Weestimate stylized Phillips curves across a sample of 11 OECD
countries using panel data regressions, and test whether growth
during recovery from financial crises tends to be more inflationary
than during recovery from other economic downturns which are
not associatedwith crisis events (henceforth referred to as ‘‘normal
downturns’’). Several recent papers have investigated the issue
of whether financial crises constitute adverse supply shocks, by
estimating their effects on long run or trend output (Barrell et al.,
2010; Benati, 2012; Cecchetti et al., 2009; Cerra and Saxena, 2008;
Furceri and Mourougane, 2009). We pursue a novel approach in
terms of detecting an impact on inflation.
2. Definitions of financial crises, recessions and recoveries
We construct our sample using data on 11 countries (G7
plus Finland, Norway, Spain and Sweden), thereby including all
major OECD economies plus several other countries which have
experienced systemic banking crises in recent history. We begin
our sample in 1990, in order to avoid the possibility of structural
change and potential for model misspecification in a longer time
series (for example, recent improvements in the efficiency of
monetary policy (Cecchetti et al., 2006) and shifts in the slope of
the Phillips curve (Borio and Filardo, 2007)).
Our definition of financial crises is derived from Laeven
and Valencia (2010), who define a systemic banking crisis as
‘‘significant signs of financial distress in the banking system’’,
accompanied by ‘‘significant banking policy interventionmeasures
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very current crisis resolution database we identify the following
crises (start dates in brackets): Finland (1991), Norway (1991),
Sweden (1991), Japan (1997), US (1988) and (2007), UK (2007),
Germany (2008) and Spain (2008). We exclude those crises
which the authors classify as ‘‘borderline’’ as it is less certain
that these led to significant tightening in credit availability,
with the following two exceptions: (1) Spain (2008), in light of
the recent acceleration of the Spanish crisis culminating in the
2011 government restructuring plan (note also that Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) classify Spain as a systemic banking crisis), and
(2) US (1988)—Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Bijapur (2010) both
present evidence that the aftermath of the Savings and Loans crisis
of the late 1980’s was associated with a significant tightening in
the availability of credit.
We characterize recessions by the adopting the familiar
technical definition of 2 consecutive quarters of decline in real
GDP (derived from the NBER’s more comprehensive definition).
On this basis, the following constitutes our sample of normal
downturns (start dates in brackets): Canada (1990) and (2008),
Finland (2008), France (1992) and (2008), Germany (1991) and
(2000), Italy (1992), (2001) and (2008), Japan (1992), (2001) and
(2008), Norway (2008), Spain (1992), Sweden (2008), UK (1990).
Finally, the recovery period starts from the first occurrence of
either two consecutive quarters of positive growth, or average
growth over 2 quarters turns positive, and lasts for 10 quarters. (In
the case of ‘‘double-dip’’ recessions, the recovery period starts after
the second dip ends).We believe this is a reasonable length of time
to estimate the effects of interest, and extending it further risks
the results becoming contaminated by other events. Our reasons
for excluding the contraction period itself from the estimation sub-
sample is that credit shortages experienced during crises are likely
to have lagged effects (due to ‘‘time to build’’ investment lags and
also lags with which stricter lending criteria transmit to actual
lending volumes).
3. Data issues and model estimation
We estimate stylized Phillips curves, specified as the relation-
ship between the change in the rate of inflation and growth in real
output, using quarterly data. In linewithmuch of the existing liter-
ature, we also include lagged commodity prices given their power
in explaining future inflation. Given that the limited number of fi-
nancial crisis episodes renders country-by-country estimation in-
feasible, we pool the data and use panel data methods in order to
increase estimation efficiency. We use a variety of estimators in
order to test for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity which
may be correlated with the regressors and thus lead to biased es-
timates: (1) Pooled OLS (all parameters are assumed fixed and ho-
mogeneous across countries), (2) one-way Fixed Effects (pooled
OLS with country-specific intercepts) and (3) Swamy Random Co-
EfficientsModel (RCM) (all parameters are random, i.e. realizations
from a probability distribution with fixed mean and variance, and
distributed independently of the regressors).
Our model specification is:
dπit = αi +
N
n=1
[(βn + uin)+ δynFit + λynRit ] ∗ dyit−n
+
N
n=1
[(γn + vin)+ δcnFit + λcnRit ] ∗ dct−n + εit
where dπit denotes second differenced log Consumer Prices Index
(CPI) for country i on date t , dyit−n and dct−n denote lagged
first differenced log GDP (chained volume measures) and log
commodity prices respectively, αi denotes a fixed effect and uinand vin denote random effects for country i (included in some
specifications). Fit and Rit are interactive dummies, set equal to 1
during the recovery periods following financial crises and normal
downturns respectively (intercept dummies are also included).
Finally, in order to isolate the impact of financial crises on inflation
and control for heterogeneity in the size of the output drop
preceding recovery across the two subsamples, we also include
a control variable. This is set equal to the (absolute value of the)
peak to trough decline in GDP (in per cent) preceding the recovery
period.
CPI and GDP data are taken from the SourceOECD database,
and commodity prices are measured using the IMF’s All Primary
Commodities spot price index (taken from the IFS database —
prior to 1992q1 we use oil prices (world average crude petroleum)
due to data unavailability). We estimate over sample period
1990q1–2011q3 (for Germany, we begin in 1992q2 in order to
exclude the re-unification break, and for Finland in 1991q2 due to
data unavailability; for Japanwe end in 2010q4 in order to exclude
the effects of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami).
We test for erosion of potential output in the aftermath of
financial crises as follows. Under normal economic conditions,
faster growth leads to accelerating inflation, thus the predicted
signs of the lag co-efficients βn are positive. However, following
a recession a large amount of spare capacity opens up and hence
the economy can grow faster without inflation taking off. Thus,
the predicted signs of the interactive dummy co-efficients λyn are
negative. However, if a financial crisis leads to erosion of potential
output, then the margin of spare capacity would be smaller, and
hence a percentage point increase in the growth rate would lead
to a larger increase in inflation relative to a normal downturn.
Thus, in the presence of this effect, the dummy co-efficients δyn
would be greater (i.e. less negative) than λyn. Formally, we test
the null H0 : Nn=1 δyn − Nn=1 λyn ≤ 0 against the alternative
H1 :Nn=1 δyn −Nn=1 λyn > 0.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots indicated
that all variables were stationary. We included 4 lags of
the GDP and commodity price variables (Wooldridge (2002)’s
panel autocorrelation test indicated this was sufficient to avoid
dynamic misspecification). The White test for heteroscedasticity
was significant, hence White-robust standard errors were used
wherever possible. Time dummies were inserted in order to
exclude outliers in the CPI data due to indirect tax changes
(Canada: 1991q1–q2, Germany: 1993q1–q2, Japan: 1997q2-q3,
Sweden: 1991q1–q2, 1993q1–q2, UK: 1991q2–q3, 1993q2–q3,
2011q1), seasonality (Norway, Spain (post-2001), Sweden, UK),
and other erratic factors (all countries: spike in fruit and vegetable
prices (2001q2–q3)).
4. Results
Table 1 reports the main results of the panel regressions. In
all three specifications the results show supportive evidence that
growth is more inflationary during the aftermath of financial
crises compared to other downturns. Consistent with economic
theory, the sum of co-efficient estimates on the output growth
lags for the whole sample is positive. The sum of growth
dummy co-efficient estimates in the normal downturn subsample
displays the predicted negative sign (although not statistically
significant), indicating that the large amount of spare capacity
created by recessions enables growth to occur with a more muted
inflation response. However, in the financial crisis subsample, the
equivalent estimate is actually positive (although not statistically
significant), suggesting that inflation is more responsive to growth
during recovery from financial crises, holding constant other
factors. The difference in magnitude of the dummy co-efficients
between financial crises and normal downturns is statistically
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Estimation results. We report the co-efficient estimates for four model specifications. Columns (1)–(3) report the results of the pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and pooled OLS
assuming heterogeneity in β4 respectively. (4) reports the results in which the German crisis is excluded.
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −.001 −.001*** −.001 −.001***
GDP(−1) .039 .041** .043 .041**
GDP(−2) −.001 .003 .010 .003
GDP(−3) .061 .071** .074 .071**
GDP(−4) −.022 −.013 −.040a −.014
COMMOD(−1) −.002 −.003 −.002 −.003
COMMOD(−2) −.014*** −.014*** −.014*** −.014***
COMMOD(−3) .001 .001 .000 .001
COMMOD(−4) −.006* −.006* −.006 −.006*
Output Drop .011 .015 .013 .014
Financial crisis dummies:
Intercept −.001 −.001** −.002 −.002***
GDP(−1) .048 .048 .056 .086**
GDP(−2) .033 .033 .029 .019
GDP(−3) −.063 −.072 −.063 −.098
GDP(−4) .078 .065 .109 .110
COMMOD(−1) −.008 −.005 −.009 −.009
COMMOD(−2) .008 .007 .007 .012
COMMOD(−3) −.007 −.005 −.007 −.008
COMMOD(−4) .009* .008 .009 .011
Normal downturn dummies:
Intercept .001 .000 .001 .000
GDP(−1) −.065 −.050 −.075 −.051
GDP(−2) .023 .030 .010 .029
GDP(−3) −.069 −.061 −.070 −.062
GDP(−4) −.024 −.026 −.018 −.025
COMMOD(−1) −.004 −.004 −.001 −.004
COMMOD(−2) .002 −.000 .001 −.000
COMMOD(−3) .007 .006 .008 .007
COMMOD(−4) .003 .000 .001 .000
Adjusted R2 .425 .443 .428 .438
(A) Sum of financial crisis GDP
dummies
.096 .075 .131 .118**
(B) Sum of normal downturn GDP
dummies
−.135 −.107 −.153 −.109
(A)–(B) .231** .182** .284** .226**
a Mean estimate across all countries.
* Indicates significance of a Wald test (one-tailed for the bottom row only) at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance of a Wald test (one-tailed for the bottom row only) at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance of a Wald test (one-tailed for the bottom row only) at the 1% level.significant in all three specifications (reported in the bottom row
of Table 1).
These results indicate that themargin of spare capacity tends to
be smaller following financial crises relative to other downturns.
Inclusion of the variable controlling for the size of the output drop
suggests that this is caused by an erosion of potential output,
as opposed to the preceding recession being shallower in crisis
episodes compared to other downturns (in fact, in our sample the
opposite is true). The positive sign on the co-efficient estimate is
somewhat puzzling (although it is not statistically significant), as
one would expect a larger output drop to lead to weaker inflation.
However, this could be explained by the fact that the output drop
variable is significantly correlatedwith the financial crisis variables
(financial crises tend to be associatedwith deeper recessions), thus
potentially giving rise to a problem of multicollinearity.
The parameter estimates remain fairly stable across all three
panel model specifications, with the signs of the dummy co-
efficients unchanged for the crisis and non-crisis subsamples,
and the difference in magnitude remaining similar. There is little
evidence of fixed effects — although the restriction of homogeneity
on country-specific intercepts is rejected at the 1% significance
level, the Hausman test strongly rejects fixed effects in favour
of random effects. In order to investigate the possibility that
our results might instead be reflecting heterogeneity in the
output-inflation trade-offs across countries,we also estimate using
the Swamy RCM specification. However, the estimated random
effects show very little dispersion around the fixed means for allregressors, with the exception of the fourth lag of GDP growth.
Re-estimating with (fixed and heterogeneous) country-specific
parameters for this variable, we find the results are largely
unaffected, although the difference in magnitude of the dummy
co-efficients actually increases in significance.
We also investigate whether our results are being dispropor-
tionately driven by an isolated crisis episode, by dropping each cri-
sis in turn and re-estimating (for brevity, we report results only
for the Fixed Effects specification although all three specifications
yield similar results). The dummy co-efficients remain relatively
stable, with the difference in magnitude ranging from 0.153 to
0.226. An interesting finding is that unlike the other recent cri-
sis episodes, the estimates actually increase in significance when
the German banking crisis is omitted, tentatively indicating that
Germany did not experience a significant impact on productive
potential.
5. Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the widely debated issue of whether
financial crises constitute adverse supply shocks and thus lead
to impairment in an economy’s productive potential. We follow
a novel approach by investigating whether inflationary pressures
tend to be stronger in the aftermath of financial crises compared
to non-crisis economic downturns. By estimating stylized Phillips
curves in an OECD panel, we find that growth experienced
during the aftermath of financial crises generates a significantly
M. Bijapur / Economics Letters 117 (2012) 700–703 703larger increase in inflation relative to normal downturns, holding
constant other relevant factors, thus pointing to impairment in
productive potential.
It needs mentioning that the evidence we find for a stronger
inflation response might be driven in part by other factors which
are characteristic of financial crises, such as the inflationary
impact of central bank balance sheet expansion (as pointed out
in Cecchetti et al., 2009). However, an attempt to disentangle the
specific mechanisms at work is beyond the scope of the present
paper and is left for future research. Nevertheless, the policy
implications are clear — as the recovery gathers pace, policy might
need to be tightened more quickly and more aggressively than
would otherwise be the case.
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